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WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
     In this suit brought under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and 
Collection Law, plaintiffs 
assert claims against individual corporate officers and shareholders for 
wages due from the 
corporate employer.   Because the claims are based on a collective 
bargaining agreement, we 
hold that the Wage Collection Law is preempted by the Labor Management 
Relations Act and 
the National Labor Relations Act.   Accordingly, we affirm the district 
court orders granting 
summary judgment and dismissing the complaint.  
     Plaintiffs are 111 employees of the Shannopin Coal Company who were 
laid off on July 
24, 1992.  Defendants are seven individuals and three corporations, 
described variously as major 
stockholders, owners, operators and agents of the employer.  Shannopin had 
filed for bankruptcy 
protection under Chapter 11 on September 31, 1991, but remained in 
operation until July 24, 
1992.  At that time, plaintiffs were owed various sums for wages actually 
earned while the 
bankruptcy was proceeding.   
     In May 1995, plaintiffs filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Greene County, 
Pennsylvania for the wages due and, as the complaint stated,  for "several 
categories of vacation 
pay (graduated, regular, floating, and personal days) all of which were 
wages guaranteed to and 
earned by the plaintiffs as part of their contract of employment with 
[Shannopin]."   
     Plaintiffs based their case on the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and 
Collection Law, 43 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 260.2, et seq. (1992), and sought liquidated damages 
and attorneys' fees, as 
well as unpaid wages.  Attached to their complaint is a schedule of the 
amounts claimed in the 
various categories of "wages, regular vacation, graduated vacation, 
floating and sick/personal."   
     Defendants removed the case to federal court, asserting that the 
"contract of employment" 
referred to in the plaintiffs' complaint was, in fact, a collective 
bargaining agreement between the 
United Mine Workers and Shannopin and that, therefore, the case was really 
an action to enforce 
the terms of the agreement under section 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 185(a).  After removal, defendants filed Answers asserting various 
defenses, including 
nonliability under the Wage Act and allegations that Shannopin had 
continued in operation after 
the bankruptcy at the insistence of the plaintiffs' union representatives.   
     The case was assigned to a magistrate judge, who concluded that the 
plaintiffs' claims 
required interpreting the collective bargaining agreement, and, as such, 
were pre-empted by 
section 301.  In addition, the magistrate judge found that plaintiffs had 
failed to exhaust their 
contractual remedies under the collective bargaining agreement.  He 
therefore recommended that 
summary judgment be granted as to those defendants who had filed 
appropriate motions and that 
the action be dismissed as to those defendants who had not joined in the 
motions.  He also denied 
the plaintiffs' motion to remand the action to the state court.  The 
district judge adopted the 
recommendations and entered appropriate orders without additional comment. 
     On appeal, plaintiffs contend that their claims are independent of 
the collective 
bargaining agreement, that once liability is established under state law, 
reference to the collective 
bargaining agreement for calculation of damages does not trigger 
preemption, and that the 
district court's ruling discriminated against union employees.   Moreover, 
plaintiffs point out that 
even if preemption is applicable, removal jurisdiction does not 
automatically follow. 
     Defendants counter that the plaintiffs' claims are based on a breach 
of the collective 
bargaining agreement and that a determination of wages and benefits due 
would require 
interpreting that agreement.  In their view, federal law preempts the 
state statute and the federal 
courts have jurisdiction. 
                                I. 
     Section 301(a) provides: "Suits for violation of contracts between an 
employer and a 
labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting 
commerce as defined in this 
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any 
district court of the 
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the 
amount in controversy or 
without regard to the citizenship of the parties."  29 U.S.C. § 185(a). 
     The matter at hand alleges a violation of a contract to which the 
union and the employer 
are signatories, but neither is a party to this suit.  Thus, the statutory 
language does not provide a 
ready answer.   
     Although section 301 refers only to jurisdiction, it has been 
interpreted as authorizing 
federal courts to fashion a body of common law for the enforcement of 
collective bargaining 
agreements.  Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 
(1957).  An underlying 
reason for the development of federal law in this area is the need for 
uniform interpretation of 
contract terms to aid both the negotiation and the administration of 
collective bargaining 
agreements.  See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 
103-04 (1962) (differing 
interpretations would stimulate and prolong labor disputes).  National 
policy is particularly 
important in the enforcement of arbitration provisions, a common element 
of most collective 
bargaining agreements.  Lingle v. Norge, Div. Of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 
U.S. 399, 410-11 (1984) 
(federal labor policy fosters uniform, certain adjudications of disputes 
over the meaning of 
collective bargaining agreements).   
     These general principles, however, draw no clear lines of demarcation 
and, as a 
consequence, section 301 pre-emption has been a fruitful source of 
litigation over the years.  Not 
surprisingly, case law has not been completely consistent, particularly 
when state law may affect 
the outcome.  In Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation 
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23 
(1983), the Court observed that, "the preemptive force of § 301 is so 
powerful as to displace 
entirely any state cause of action ‘for violation of contracts between an 
employer and a labor 
organization.'  Any such suit is purely a creature of federal law, 
notwithstanding the fact that 
state law would provide a cause of action in the absence of § 301."  
     However, not all state law is preempted.  In Lingle, the Court 
concluded that an employee 
could enforce a state law banning retaliatory discharge, even though she 
was covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement that provided for arbitration for claims 
of discharge without 
cause.  Lingle held that courts could resolve matters of state law 
involving labor-management 
relations, but only if such matters were outside the "arbitral realm" of 
collective bargaining 
agreements.  486 U.S. at 411.   Section 301 preemption "ensures that 
federal law will be the basis 
for interpreting collective-bargaining agreements."  Id. at 409.  But that 
section does not address 
the substantive benefits a state may provide to workers "when adjudication 
of those rights does 
not depend upon the interpretation of such agreements."  Id.  
     In a footnote, the Lingle Court commented that in some situations, 
although federal law 
may govern the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement to 
determine proper 
damages, the underlying state law claim, not otherwise preempted, would 
prevail.  Hence, 
resolution of a state law claim could depend upon both the interpretation 
of the collective 
bargaining agreement and a separate state law analysis that does not turn 
on the agreement.  Id. at 
413 n.12. 
     The "independent" nature of the plaintiffs' claim was the deciding 
factor in Caterpillar, 
Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987).  There, employees sued for breach 
of contracts that were 
outside the scope of the collective bargaining agreement.  Thus, 
construction of that agreement 
was unnecessary to establish the plaintiffs' case.   Id. at 396. 
     An example of a dependent state law remedy occurred in International 
Bhd. of Elec. 
Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987).  There, an employee filed a 
common law tort suit in 
state court against her union, charging that it had failed to fulfill its 
duty of providing safe 
conditions in the workplace, as it assumed to do in the collective 
bargaining agreement.  The 
Supreme Court concluded that the claim was preempted because courts would 
be required to 
interpret the collective bargaining agreement to determine if such a duty 
had been placed on the 
union and if the agreement defined the nature and scope of that duty.  Id. 
at 861-62.  Hence, 
"[t]he need for federal uniformity in the interpretation of contract terms 
. . . mandates that here, 
as in Allis-Chalmers, [plaintiff] is precluded from evading the pre-
emptive force of § 301 by 
casting her claim as a state-law tort action."  Id. at 862.   
     In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck , 471 U.S. 202 (1985), an employee 
brought suit in 
state court against his employer and the insurer of a health and 
disability plan established by a 
collective bargaining agreement.  The complaint alleged bad faith in the 
handling of the 
plaintiff's disability claim.  Reversing the state's highest court, the 
United States Supreme Court 
held that the claim was preempted.   
     Emphasizing that the meaning given a contract phrase or term must be 
subject to uniform 
federal law, Lueck explained that "questions relating to what the parties 
to a labor agreement 
agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of 
that agreement, 
must be resolved by reference to uniform federal law."  471 U.S. at 211.  
That rule applies 
"whether such questions arise in the context of a suit for breach of 
contract or in a suit alleging 
liability in tort."  Id.  The Court observed:  "Any other result would 
elevate form over substance 
and allow parties to evade the requirements of § 301 by relabeling their 
contract claims as claims 
for tortious breach of contract."  Id.     
     The Court was especially concerned that if state law were "allowed to 
determine the 
meaning intended by the parties in adopting a particular contract phrase 
or term, all the evils 
addressed in Lucas Flour would recur," including the uncertainties over "a 
right to collect 
benefits under certain circumstances."  Lueck, 202 U.S. at 211.  The Court 
ultimately decided 
that because the right asserted derived from the contract, and was defined 
by the contractual 
obligation of good faith, any attempt to assess liability inevitably 
involved contract 
interpretation.  Even though "the state court may choose to define the 
tort as `independent' of 
any contract questions . . . .  Congress has mandated that federal law 
govern the meaning given 
contract terms."  Lueck, 471 U.S. at 218-19.   
     Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 114 S.Ct. 2068 (1994), presented 
another variation 
on the problem.  In that case, the Court concluded that federal labor law 
was not in conflict with 
a state statute that imposed a monetary penalty for each day that passed 
between an employee's 
discharge and receipt of payments for wages due.  The employee had sued to 
recover a sum equal 
to the wages for the three days that elapsed between her discharge and her 
receipt of a check 
from the employer.  The Supreme Court emphasized that there was no dispute 
over the amount 
of the penalty to which the employee was entitled.  Thus, "the mere need 
`to look' to the 
collective-bargaining agreement for damage computation is no reason to 
hold the state law claim 
defeated by § 301."  Id. at 2079.   
     In those circumstances, the Court concluded that the collective 
bargaining agreement was 
irrelevant to the dispute between the employer and employee.  Nor was 
there any "indication that 
the parties to the collective-bargaining agreement understood their 
arbitration pledge to cover 
these state-law claims."  Livadas, 114 S.Ct. at 2079.  Indeed, the 
collective bargaining agreement 
provided that a direct wage claim not involving interpretation of the 
agreement could be 
submitted to any other tribunal or agency that was authorized and 
empowered to enforce it.  Id. at 
2080.  The Court also commented that Congress had not intended to present 
the plaintiff with the 
"unappetizing choice" between having her state law rights enforced or 
exercising her right to 
enter into a collective bargaining agreement with an arbitration clause.  
Id. at 2075.   
     From this brief glance at some of the many Supreme Court opinions in 
this field, certain 
observations may be drawn.  In general, claims based squarely on a 
collective bargaining 
agreement or requiring analysis of its terms are preempted by section 301 
and are removable to 
the federal courts.  See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413; Hechler, 481 U.S at 859; 
Lueck, 471 U.S. at 215;Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 23.  Claims that are 
independent of a collective bargaining 
agreement, even if they are between employees and employers, are not 
removable.  See Livadas, 
512 U.S. 107, 114 S.Ct. at 2078-79; Lingle, 486 U.S. at 410; Caterpillar, 
482 U.S. at 394-95.    
                               II. 
     We now move to the specific issues presented in this case.  
Logically, the first inquiry 
must be jurisdiction.  Plaintiffs contend that the case was not removable 
from the state court.   
     Cautioning that preemption and removal jurisdiction were separate 
concepts, the Court in 
Caterpillar concluded that the plaintiffs' suit could not be removed from 
the state court.  The 
Court emphasized that the "complete preemption" doctrine applies to 
"claims founded directly 
on rights created by collective bargaining agreements, and also claims 
that are `substantially 
dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.'"  
Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394.  
However, the "well-pleaded complaint" rule prevents removal to federal 
court if a plaintiff 
chooses to present only a state law claim and preemption is raised solely 
as a defense.  Id. at 398- 
99.  Although preemption may be a valid defense, jurisdiction remains with 
the state court.  Id. at 
399.   
     The complaint here demanded payment for wages based on "contract."  
This Court has 
held that the Wage Act "does not create a right to compensation. . . . 
[r]ather, it provides a 
statutory remedy when the employer breaches a contractual obligation to 
pay earned wages.  The 
contract between the parties governs in determining whether specific wages 
are earned."  Weldon 
v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 801 (3d Cir. 1990).  
     This suit is based "squarely on the terms of the collective 
bargaining agreement."  
Wheeler v. Graco Trucking Corp., 985 F.2d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 1993), and the 
face of the 
complaint states a federal claim.  Section 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act contains 
civil enforcement provisions within the scope of which the plaintiffs' 
claim falls.  Dukes v. U.S. 
Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 355 (3d Cir. 1995); Geopel v. National 
Postal Mail Handlers 
Union, 36 F.3d 306, 311 (3d Cir. 1994).  Although the individual 
defendants are not signatories 
to the collective bargaining agreement, they may be parties to a section 
301 suit.  Wilkes-Barre 
Publishing Co. v. Newspaper Guild of Wilkes-Barre, 647 F.2d 372, 378 (3d 
Cir. 1981).  In 
addition, as the district court properly found "the plaintiffs' alleged 
entitlement to compensation 
and benefits is disputed and cannot be discerned without analyzing the 
terms of the collective 
bargaining agreement."  Thus, preemption is not raised solely as a 
defense.  In these 
circumstances, we are persuaded that the case was properly removed to the 
district court. 
                              III.   
     As noted earlier, the plaintiffs' suit was brought under the terms of 
the Pennsylvania 
Wage Collection Law, which provides that any employee or group of 
employees may institute 
actions for wages payable.  43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 260.9a(a) (1992).  
If judgment is entered 
for the plaintiffs, "the court . . . shall . . . allow costs of 
reasonable" attorneys' fees.  43 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 260.9a(f).  Section 260.2a defines employer as "every person, 
firm, partnership, 
association, corporation, receiver or other officer of a court of this 
Commonwealth, and any 
agent or officer of any of the above-mentioned classes employing any 
person in this 
Commonwealth."   Plaintiffs seek to hold defendants personally  liable as 
agents or officers.   
     On several occasions, this Court has reviewed the relationship 
between this statute and 
federal labor law.  The first time the issue was raised was in Carpenters 
Health & Welfare Fund 
v. Kenneth R. Ambrose, Inc., 727 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1983).  In that case, a 
pension fund sued for 
unpaid contributions due a health and welfare plan.  The complaint cited 
both section 301 and the 
Pennsylvania Wage Law.  The defendants were the corporate employer and its 
two sole officers, 
who were also the  majority stockholders.  We determined that the 
individual officers were not 
liable under section 301 because there was insufficient evidence to 
conclude that they were 
acting as alter egos of the corporation.  Id. at 284. 
     We rejected the district court's conclusion that the word "employer," 
as used in the Labor 
Management Relation Act, "has as broad a meaning as the [Wage Law] 
definition would 
suggest," and we quoted with approval Combs v. Indyk, 554 F.Supp. 573 
(W.D. Pa. 1982).  
Ambrose, 727 F.2d at 284.  In Combs, the district court stated, "it 
appears that insulation of 
corporate officers and agents from liability for section 301 violations 
was, in part, a basis for the 
parallel insulation of officers and members of local unions from liability 
for section 301 
violations."  554 F.Supp. at 575, citing Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining 
Co., 370 U.S. 238, 249 
(1962) (union members are exempt from personal liability for judgments 
against the union).   
     Ambrose did, however, hold the individual officers liable under the 
Wage Law, even 
though "imposing liability for unpaid pension benefits on persons who have 
not contractually 
agreed to make the payments seems a harsh result."  727 F.2d at 283.  In 
response to the 
defendants' argument that the Wage Law was preempted by the Labor 
Management Relations 
Act and ERISA, the panel said in a brief footnote that "we find these 
contentions to be without 
merit."  Id. at 282 n.5.   
     However, in Solomon v. Klein, 770 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1985), in an 
analogous situation, 
we held that individual corporate officers were not liable under ERISA for 
delinquent 
contributions owed by the corporate employer.  The majority of courts in 
other jurisdictions have 
held likewise.   In McMahon v. McDowell, 794 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1986), we 
held that 
Ambrose's statement that the Wage Law was not preempted by ERISA was no 
longer valid in 
light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 
724 (1985) and Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983). 
     The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in National 
Metalcrafters v. McNeil, 784 
F.2d 817, 825 (7th Cir. 1986), commenting on the Ambrose footnote, said, 
"the particulars of the 
contentions and the grounds of the court's action are inscrutable" and 
noted further that Lueckhad placed the case "under a shadow."  The McNeil 
Court concluded that the Illinois Wage 
Payment and Collection Act was preempted by section  301.  "The only basis 
of the state-law 
claim in this case is that the company broke its contract to grant 
vacation pay of a certain 
amount.  No state law required that any vacation pay be given or fixed the 
rate of such pay if 
given."  Id. at 824.  Consequently, the claim required interpreting the 
collective bargaining 
agreement.   
     We had occasion to revisit the Ambrose footnote in Wheeler.  There, a 
former employee 
sued his corporate employer and an officer of the company for wages 
alleged to be due.  The 
action was based on both the Labor Management Relations Act and the 
Pennsylvania Wage Law.  
We held that the section 301 suit was barred because the plaintiff had 
failed to exhaust the 
arbitration requirements in the collective bargaining agreement.  We also 
held that the Wage Law 
claim was preempted because its basis was the collective bargaining 
agreement and, therefore, 
was "governed exclusively by federal law."  Wheeler, 985 F.2d at 113.   
     In a footnote, Wheeler explained that "we think the statement in the 
Ambrose footnote is 
best understood to mean that the [Wage Law's] definition of an employer 
was, as our prior 
opinion put it, `subsumed within the federal common law.'"  Id. at 113-14 
n.2.  (In the first 
Ambrose opinion, 665 F.2d 466, 470 (3d Cir. 1981), the panel had remanded 
to the district court 
to determine if the Wage Law was "subsumed within the federal common 
law.").  However, as 
we have observed here, in the second Ambrose opinion, the panel decided 
that the Labor 
Management Relations definition of "employer" was not as broad as that in 
the Wage Law.   It 
would seem that despite Wheeler's efforts, the Ambrose footnote remains 
inscrutable.  In any 
event, we believe that Wheeler's holding of preemption is more in keeping 
with the Supreme 
Court's subsequent opinion in Lueck, which undermined the Ambrose 
footnote.    
     District court opinions within Pennsylvania have differed in their 
approach to preemption 
in the Wage Law situation.  Compare Lawrence v. Regal, 851 F. Supp. 202, 
204 (W.D. Pa. 
1993), aff'd 19 F.3d 643 (table) (3d Cir. 1994) (section 301 preempts 
claim against corporate 
officers under the Wage Law), with Tener v. Hoag, 697 F. Supp. 196, 197 
(W.D. Pa. 1988) 
(Ambrose imposes personal liability on corporate officers (ERISA claim)), 
Central Pa. Teamsters 
Pension Fund v. Burten, 634 F. Supp. 128, 131 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (non-
resident officers not subject 
to personal jurisdiction under Wage Law) and Amalgamated Cotton Garment & 
Allied Indus. 
Fund. v. J.B.C. Co. of Madera, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 158, 166 (W.D. Pa. 1984) 
(personal liability 
imposed on corporate officers because of Ambrose footnote).  See also In 
re Futura Indus. Inc., 
69 B.R. 831, 836 (E.D.Pa. 1987) (Ambrose approved personal liability of 
corporate officers 
under the Wage Law); In re District 2, United Mine Workers, 67 B.R. 883, 
887 (W.D.Pa. 1986) 
(National Labor Relations Act preempts Wage Law, but Labor Management 
Relations Act's lack 
of preemption controlled by Ambrose footnote). 
                               IV. 
     The plaintiffs' suit is against individual officers and stockholders 
of the corporation.  
Under the Wage Law, officers become the "employer" and are personally 
liable for obligations 
of the corporate employer.  That definition created by state law, if 
applied to the Labor 
Management Relations Act, would substantially alter the scope and 
enforcement of the typical 
collective bargaining agreement.   
     The extent of the conflict between the two statutes is apparent under 
the most 
accommodating construction of the Wage Law with federal law, that is, that 
a signatory 
corporate employer is not deprived of its rights under a collective 
bargaining agreement, but its 
officers would be individually liable.  Under this scenario, a corporation 
would be entitled to 
invoke the exclusive arbitration provisions of the agreement.  That 
possibility was not explored 
in Ambrose because the corporation did not appeal an adverse decision in 
the district court.  
     However, Wheeler held that the Wage Law was preempted by the Labor 
Management 
Relations Act.  Hence, the corporate employer's right to arbitration 
provided by the collective 
bargaining agreement remained in effect.  Although holding in favor of an 
officer in his 
individual capacity, Wheeler did not discuss in any detail its reasons for 
that decision.  On 
reflection however, it is clear that the holding was correct. 
     If the Wage Law were construed to expand the definition of employer 
in collective 
bargaining agreements to include corporate officers, a number of adverse 
effects on federal labor 
law would follow.  In addition to removing the long-standing insulation of 
officers from personal 
liability for corporate debts, see Solomon, 770 F.2d at 354, application 
of the Wage Law 
definition would allow wage claimants to sue corporate officers in state 
court.   Thus, employees 
could bypass the grievance procedures established by a collective 
bargaining agreement, as well 
as the federal time limits for enforcing section 301.  "A contrary rule 
which would permit an 
individual employee to completely sidestep available grievance procedures 
in favor of a lawsuit 
has little to commend it."  Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 
655 (1965).   
     Moreover, the application of a collective bargaining agreement 
covering the activities of a 
corporation doing business in a number of states would be subject to the 
vagaries of state law.  
For example, although an employee in Pennsylvania covered by a collective 
bargaining 
agreement would be free to bypass the arbitration provisions by suing the 
officers or corporation 
under the Wage Law, another employee in a different state, working under 
the very same 
collective bargaining agreement would be limited to the arbitration 
process.  This is not the 
uniform enforcement contemplated by federal labor law.  In effect, 
permitting use of the Wage 
Law in disputes where collective bargaining agreements are in force, 
undermines the uniformity 
of federal labor law in a critical area -- enforcing wage agreements, a 
mandatory subject for 
collective bargaining.   
     As noted earlier, Lueck emphasized the need to protect and enforce 
the provisions of 
collective bargaining agreements where the parties had agreed that a 
neutral arbitrator would be 
responsible, in the first instance, for interpreting the meaning of the 
contract.  Unless preemption 
is given effect, the "federal right to decide who is to resolve contract 
disputes will be lost."  
Lueck, 202 U.S. at 219.  If that occurs, "claims involving vacation or 
overtime pay, work 
assignments, unfair discharge -- in short, the whole range of disputes 
traditionally resolved 
through arbitration -- could be brought in the first instance by a 
complaint in tort rather than in 
contract."  Id. at 219-20. 
     Nor do we accept the plaintiffs' argument that Livadas requires a 
different result here.   
There, the statutory penalty was fixed by the wages agreed to have been 
due on the date of 
discharge, multiplied by the number of days before payment.  There was no 
need to refer to the 
collective bargaining agreement to calculate the penalty and no one 
asserted that there was an 
interference with the arbitral process.  Livadas did not present the 
situation found in the case at 
hand where an employee could bypass arbitration by resorting to the 
statute.  Moreover, the 
employer here insists that there are uncertainties about eligibility for 
the types of vacation pay, as 
well as the correct amounts due in those instances.  Such matters, Lueck 
observed, are proper 
grist for the arbitration mill.  In addition, unlike the Wage Law, the 
statute in Livadas did not 
impose individual liability on the employer's officers and agents.          
     Plaintiffs also contend that preemption of the Wage Law amounts to 
discrimination 
against those covered by collective bargaining agreements because other 
employees can pursue 
claims under the state statute.  See Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2075;  
Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 
756 (Wagner Act did not seek to penalize workers for joining unions).  
Although that argument 
has some surface appeal, it fails to acknowledge the existence of 
compensating factors when 
federal law governs employment.  See Rebecca Hanner White, Section 301's 
Preemption of State 
Law Claims:  A Model for Analysis, 41 Ala. L. Rev. 377, 392 (1990).   
     Collective bargaining agreements frequently contain provisions for 
favorable working 
conditions.  A key benefit union status often confers on workers is the 
presence of a "just cause" 
standard for discharge or discipline.  Even more important, the grievance 
and arbitration process, 
a standard feature of almost all collective bargaining agreements, offers 
union members a means 
for quick and inexpensive resolution of contract disputes.  Permitting 
employees to sue in state 
courts in order to bypass arbitration not only dilutes its effectiveness, 
but calls into question its 
very existence.  Non-exclusivity of arbitration "would inevitably exert a 
disruptive influence 
upon both the negotiation and administration of collective agreements."  
Republic Steel, 379 
U.S. at 653, quoting Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. at 103.   
     Federal  law rests on the premise that limitation of certain rights 
afforded by the states is 
justified by having a uniform labor policy.  We are persuaded that 
procedures for resolving 
claims for wages, vacation and benefits fall within the category of 
matters where national policy 
controls.   
 
     We conclude, therefore, that the Pennsylvania Wage Law is preempted 
by the Labor 
Management Relations Act and the National Labor Relations Act.  The 
judgment of the district 
court will be affirmed. 
 
Antol v. Esposto, No. 95-3714 
MANSMANN, J., dissenting. 
 
     This case presents the difficult and close question of whether 
section 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), preempts the employees' 
action against the 
owners of the company for unpaid wages, liquidated damages and attorneys 
fees, which is 
permitted under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law, 43 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
260.2, et seq. (1992).  We gleaned from the complaint that the former 
employees of Shannopin 
Mining Company sued the owners and operators, as well as the major 
shareholders, of the 
company because the company is in bankruptcy and has failed to pay them 
what is due and 
owing.  Because I believe that the employees' WPCL claims are not 
preempted, I respectfully 
dissent from the majority's opinion.  The Supreme Court's decision in 
Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 
U.S. 107, 114 S. Ct. 2068 (1994), guides my decision. 
     In Livadas, the Supreme Court held that an employee's action based 
upon a state law right 
to receive a penalty payment from her employer was not preempted under the 
LMRA even 
though the penalty was tacked to her wages, which were governed by a 
collective bargaining 
agreement.  At issue in Livadas was a California law which required 
employers to pay all wages 
due immediately upon an employee's discharge, Labor Code § 201; imposed a 
penalty for refusal 
to pay promptly, section 203; and placed responsibility for enforcing 
these provisions on the 
Commissioner of Labor.  After Karen Livadas' employer refused to pay her 
the wages owed upon 
her discharge, but paid them a few days later, Livadas filed a penalty 
claim pursuant to California 
Labor Code § 203.  The Commissioner of Labor responded to Livadas' request 
with a form letter 
construing another provision of the California Labor Code, Labor Code § 
229, as barring him 
from enforcing Livadas' claim because her terms and conditions of 
employment were governed 
by a collective bargaining agreement containing an arbitration cause.  The 
provisions of Labor 
Code § 229 expressly precluded the Commissioner from adjudicating any 
dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of any collective bargaining agreement 
containing an arbitration 
clause.  After the Commissioner refused to enforce Livadas' claim, Livadas 
commenced an 
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the Commissioner's non-
enforcement policy 
was preempted by federal law because it abridged her rights under section 
7 of the National 
Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157.  The 
Commissioner argued that 
his non-enforcement policy (and Labor Code § 229) was required by federal 
law, namely section 
301 of the LMRA, which has been read to preempt state-court resolution of 
disputes turning on 
the rights of parties under collective bargaining agreements.   
     Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous court, disagreed.  Presented 
with the opportunity 
to preempt California Labor Code provisions granting protections to 
terminated employees and 
providing penalties against employers for violation of those protections, 
the Court instead held 
preempted the California Labor Commissioner's policy of refusing to 
enforce those provisions 
when the terminated employees were covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement containing an 
arbitration clause. 
     Relying upon its prior decisions in Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 
200 (1985), and 
Lingle v. Norge, Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988), the 
Court held that section 
301 could not be read broadly to preempt non-negotiable rights conferred 
upon individual 
employees as a matter of state law and stressed that it is the legal 
character of the claim as 
"independent" of rights under the collective bargaining agreement that 
decides whether a state 
cause of action may go forward.  The Court reiterated that "[w]hen the 
meaning of contract terms 
is not the subject of the dispute, the bare fact that a collective 
bargaining agreement will be 
consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not require 
the claim to be 
extinguished."  Livadas, 512 U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2077, citing 
Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413, n.12 
("A collective bargaining agreement may, of course, contain information 
such as rate of pay . . . 
that might be helpful in determining the damages to which a worker 
prevailing in a state-law suit 
is entitled."). 
     Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that these principles 
foreclosed even a 
colorable argument that Livadas' claim under section 203 of the California 
Labor Code was 
preempted.  The Court observed that beyond the simple need to refer to 
bargained for wages rates 
in computing the penalty, the collective bargaining agreement was 
irrelevant to the dispute 
between Livadas and her employer.  The Supreme Court distinguished 
Livadas' situation from 
the situation in Plumbing, Heating and Piping Employers Council of 
Northern California v. 
Howard, 53 Cal. App.3d 828, 836 (1975), where an employee sought to have 
paid an unpaid 
wage claim based upon his interpretation that his collective bargaining 
agreement entitled him to 
a higher wage.  The employee there asserted that under the collective 
bargaining agreement, he 
was entitled to receive a foreman's rate of pay and not a journeyman's.  
The Supreme Court 
observed, "that sort of claim, however, derives its existence from the 
collective bargaining 
agreement, and accordingly, falls within any customary understanding of 
arbitral jurisdiction."  
Livadas, 512 U.S. at ___ n.6 and 512 U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2078-79 
n.20. 
     Interestingly, the Court in Livadas acknowledged that "Courts of 
Appeals have not been 
entirely uniform in their understanding and application of the principles 
set down in Lingle and 
Lueck," but found that Livadas, "in which nonpre-emption under § 301 is 
clear beyond 
preadventure" was "not a fit occasion . . . to resolve disagreements that 
have arisen over the 
scope of our earlier decisions."  Livadas, 512 U.S. at ___ n.18, 114 S. 
Ct. at 2078 n.18.  
     Livadas is dispositive here.  In this case, the employees seek wages 
allegedly due them 
for the two weeks they worked prior to their lay-offs as well as vacation 
pay.  Recovery of these 
wages is expressly provided for by Pennsylvania's Wage Payment and 
Collection Law which is 
virtually identical to the California law involved in Livadas.  Both state 
laws grant a right of 
compensation for earned wages, including vacation pay.  Under the WPCL: 
     Any employee or group of employees, labor organization or party to 
whom any 
     type of wages is payable may institute actions provided under this 
Act. 
 
43 P.A. § 260.9a(a), Adam v. Benjamin, 627 A.2d 1186, 1191 (Pa. Super. 
1993), alloc. denied, 
642 A.2d 482 (Pa. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 92 (1994).  "The right 
to recover wages `earned' 
by the plaintiffs'/employees upon separation from employment is a 
statutory remedy which 
supplements (rather than supplants) a common law cause of action for 
breach of contract."  
Adam v. Benjamin, 627 A.2d at 1198.  This Pennsylvania right is 
nonnegotiable and applies to 
unionized and nonunionized employees alike. 
     The majority attempts to distinguish Livadas' case from this case 
because the Supreme 
Court in Livadas found that there was no dispute between Livadas and her 
employer over the 
amount of the penalty to which Livadas was entitled.  I do not believe, 
however, that federal 
preemption can turn on whether or not an employer chooses to dispute the 
amount of wages an 
employee is entitled, under state law, to receive.  Thus, I cannot accept 
the majority's distinction.  
To do so would mean that an employer could utilize section 301 preemption 
to avoid liability by 
raising a dispute concerning the amount of wages owed in any given case. 
     Moreover, in this case, although the owner/operators of the mine 
contend that the 
employees' alleged entitlement to compensation and benefits is in dispute 
and cannot be 
discerned without interpretation of their collective bargaining agreement, 
they have failed to 
convince me that specific provisions of the collective bargaining 
agreement are actually 
implicated here.  In order to determine whether a party's state law claim 
is preempted per section 
301, we look to see whether the resolution of the claim depends on the 
meaning, or requires the 
interpretation, of a collective bargaining agreement.  Lingle, 486 U.S. at 
405-406.  Here, in order 
to determine the amount of wages owed the former employees of Shannopin 
Mining Company, a 
court need only consult the appendix of the National Bituminous Coal Wage 
Agreement, 
NBCWA, at the conclusion of the collective bargaining agreement, which 
sets forth the 
remuneration that employees are to receive on a daily and hourly basis by 
job classification.  
After consulting the appendix, the calculation of any amount of unpaid 
wages will be based upon 
a calendar, as well as the employer's records, showing the amount of time 
that individual 
employees have worked.  Since the resolution of these employees' claims 
for unpaid wages does 
not depend upon the meaning, or require the interpretation, of a 
collective bargaining agreement, 
their claims should not be preempted here. 
     One final comment about federal labor policy.  It is important to 
note that the employees 
involved in this case could not receive their duly earned wages from the 
company through the 
arbitration process because the company was in bankruptcy after July 24, 
1992, the last day the 
employees performed work.  Thus, I am not concerned that allowing 
employees to assert their 
state right to be paid for their earned wages would interfere with the 
arbitration process in the 
normal case, or would encourage employees to sidestep available grievance 
procedures in favor 
of lawsuits.  Consequently, a uniform labor policy in favor of arbitration 
will not be disturbed by 
this Pennsylvania procedure which permits the unfortunate employee of a 
bankrupt company to 
seek recourse against parties not covered by the collective bargaining 
agreement through an 
additional means of redress in these unusual circumstances. 
